State Constitutional Law - Refusing to Turn the Other Cheek - New Mexico Rejects Federal Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: State v. Gutierrez by Oliver, Shannon
Volume 24 
Issue 3 Summer 1994 
Summer 1994 
State Constitutional Law - Refusing to Turn the Other Cheek - New 
Mexico Rejects Federal Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary 
Rule: State v. Gutierrez 
Shannon Oliver 
Recommended Citation 
Shannon Oliver, State Constitutional Law - Refusing to Turn the Other Cheek - New Mexico Rejects Federal 
Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: State v. Gutierrez, 24 N.M. L. Rev. 545 (1994). 
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmlr/vol24/iss3/18 
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by The University of New Mexico School of 
Law. For more information, please visit the New Mexico Law Review website: www.lawschool.unm.edu/nmlr 
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Refusing to "Turn the
Other Cheek"-New Mexico Rejects Federal "Good
Faith" Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: State v.
Gutierrez
I. INTRODUCTION
I love NYPD BLUE. The police officers are protectors of ordinary
citizens, thoughtful intelligent human beings and a scourge to criminals.
If they blink or wink at the faux pas of a colleague, or overlook a point
of procedure, it is to protect the innocent-to shelter those the system
might otherwise injure. But to quote the esteemed Justice Douglas, "Of
course, the education we receive from mystery stories and television shows
* . .is, however, a distorted reflection of the constitutional system under
which we are supposed to live."' In State v. Gutierrez,2 we are reminded
that the constitution protects the innocent and the guilty from unlawful
search and seizure.
In Gutierrez, the Supreme Court of New Mexico affirmed the court
of appeals3 and rejected the application of the federal "good faith"
exception 4 to the New Mexico Constitution's exclusionary rule.' In so
doing, the court joined those courts which only in recent years have
considered the "good faith" of a police officer in relation to a violation
of a citizen's constitutional rights. This Note provides an overview of
the federal exclusionary rule doctrine, examines the rationale of Gutierrez,
and explores the implications of this bold decision.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On August 14, 1989, five officers of the Albuquerque Police Department
(APD) Valley Impact Team, Narcotics Unit, burst unannounced into the
home of Mr. and Mrs. Gutierrez and their son Johnny Garcia. 6 Officer
Carla Gandara opened the door, ran in, yelled "Police, down!" and
then ran directly to the back of the house. 7 Officers seized contraband
1. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 315 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
2. State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431, 863 P.2d 1052 (1993) [hereinafter Gutierrez I1].
3. State v. Gutierrez, 112 N.M. 774, 819 P.2d 1332 (Ct. App. 1991) [hereinafter Gutierrez 1].
4. The United States Supreme Court developed the "good faith" exception in United States
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
5. N.M. CoNST. art. II, § 10, provides:
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes, and effects, from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place, or seize
any person or thing, shall issue without describing the place to be searched, or the
persons or things to be seized, nor without a written showing of probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation.
6. Gutierrez II, 116 N.M. at 432, 863 P.2d at 1053.
7. Id.
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at the residence, and defendants were later indicted on various drug
charges. 8
Ten days before this incident, the district judge issued a warrant
authorizing an unannounced-entry9 search warrant "for the protection of
the officers and for the preservation of evidence."' 0 The "no-knock"
warrant was based on an affidavit presented to the district judge by
Officer Carla Gandara. l" The affidavit asserted that drugs are often
destroyed before officers can enter the premises of persons suspected of
drug trafficking. 2 Yet, the affidavit failed to give any specific evidence
that Officer Gandara had reason to believe drugs would be destroyed
upon a police-knock at the Gutierrez residence.
At the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress evidence, Officer
Gandara testified that she had a "good faith" belief that the warrant
was valid. 14 Nevertheless, the trial court granted the defendant's motion
to suppress, concluding that the United States and New Mexico Con-
stitutions require an officer executing a warrant to knock and announce
her purpose prior to entry absent exigent circumstances. 5 Moreover,
particularly in this case, the trial court explained that there were insuf-
ficient exigent circumstances to permit a "no-knock" entry. 6
On appeal, the New Mexico Court of Appeals rejected the "good
faith" exception pursuant to article II, section 10 of the New Mexico
Constitution. 7 Thus, the court affirmed the trial court's order suppressing
evidence as a result of the execution of a "no-knock" search warrant
at the defendant's residence.' "The court criticized the Leon Court's
cost-benefit analysis of the exclusionary rule,"' 19 believing that the good
8. Id. at 432-33, 863 P.2d at 1053-54 ("Nothing in the record suggest[ed] that the officers
discovered weapons of any sort.").
The Grand Jury indicted Reymundo and Gloria Gutierrez, husband and wife, and Gloria's son,
Johnny Garcia, on three counts: "possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute ...
, conspiracy to commit possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute ... and
possession of drug paraphernalia .... " Id. at 433, 963 P.2d at 1054.
9. "Warrants that authorize unannounced entry by executing officers have come to be known
as 'no-knock' warrants." Id. at 432, 863 P.2d at 1053 n.l.
10. Gutierrez II, 116 N.M. at 432, 863 P.2d at 1053.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. A "no-knock" warrant is something of an anomaly, for it requires a predetermination
of exigent circumstances. Most jurisdictions do not allow the predetermination of exigent circum-
stances. See id. at 433, 863 P.2d at 1054; see also, 2 WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 4.8
(g) (2d ed. 1986); State v. Eminowicz, 520 P.2d 330 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974). Compare State v.
Cleveland, 348 N.W.2d 512 (Wis. 1984). The court in Gutierrez II explicitly refused to address "the
validity of a judicial predetermination of necessity for unannounced entry." 116 N.M. at 433, 863
P.2d at 1054.
14. Tr. of Suppress. Hr'g at 52.
15. Gutierrez II, 116 N.M. at 433, 863 P.2d at 1054.
16. Id. The exigent circumstance exception is one exception to the warrant clause of the Fourth
Amendment. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (finding that "in most instances,
failure to comply with the warrant requirement can only be excused by exigent circumstances").
17. Gutierrez I, 112 N.M. at 780, 819 P.2d at 1338. "Writing for a two-judge majority, Judge
Chavez held that the New Mexico Constitution does not embody a good faith exception to [the
exclusionary rule]." Gutierrez II, 116 N.M. at 433, 863 P.2d at 1054 (citation omitted).
18. Gutierrezl, 112 N.M. at 780, 819 P.2d at 1338.
19. Gutierrez II, 116 N.M. at 433, 863 P.2d at 1054.
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faith exception "swallowed" the constitutional requirement of probable
cause.
20
The New Mexico Supreme Court granted the State's petition for cer-
tiorari. At issue was whether the evidence of contraband seized by police,
pursuant to a state search warrant which violates article II, section 10
of the New Mexico Constitution, may nonetheless be accepted by a New
Mexico court under the "good faith" theory created by the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Leon.2'
III. HISTORICAL AND CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND
A. The Federal Exclusionary Rule before Leon
Appreciating the full import of Leon requires consideration of the
history of the Court's exclusionary rule jurisprudence. Just over seventy-
five years ago, the United States Supreme Court held that evidence seized
in violation of the Fourth Amendment was inadmissible in federal criminal
prosecutions.Y
This doctrine, which came to be known as the exclusionary rule, rested
on the principle that it was wrong for the government to profit from
the unconstitutional acts of its agents.Y Thus, this rationale established
the constitutional basis of the exclusionary rule.Y
In 1961, the Court extended the exclusionary rule to the states in Mapp
v. Ohio.2 Following Mapp, the exclusionary rule was expanded to protect
the rights of individuals not only under the Fourth Amendment, but also
for violations of Fifth2 and Sixth Amendment27 rights. The Warren Court
gradually created an exclusionary, rule that relied on traditional probable
cause warrant analysis to decide reasonableness.2 Since the Warren Court,
the Court has consistently limited the application of the exclusionary rule
to select judicial proceedings.29
20. Gutierrezl, 112 N.M. at 780, 819 P.2d at 1338.
21. GutierrezII, 116 N.M. at 432-33, 863 P.2d at 1053-54 (citing United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897 (1984)).
22. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (stating that the use of seized evidence
involved a "denial of the constitutional rights of the accused," the Court banned the use of evidence
secured through "illegal search and seizure" in federal prosecution).
23. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) ("The essence of
a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in certain ways, is that not merely evidence so
acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all.").
24. Id. at 390-93.
25. 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
26. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966).
27. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 201-06 (1964).
28. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (deciding that outside of a search of
the area within an arrestee's control, a search of the premises must be made pursuant to a warrant
based on probable cause); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969) (holding that when authorized,
electronic eavesdropping can be done only with probable cause); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
(1967) (suggesting that warrantless searches are unreasonable absent exigent circumstances).
29. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (holding that
the exclusionary rule does not apply in a civil deportation hearing); United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338 (1974) (holding that a grand jury witness may not refuse to answer questions on the
ground that they are based on evidence obtained in an unlawful search).
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Today, some scholars maintain that the Supreme Court has opened a
pandora's box of exceptions to the exclusionary rule.30 The erosion of
the exclusionary rule began by naming deterrence as the sole purpose of
the exclusionary rule.3 Since then, the Court has moved from the con-
stitutional theory of the exclusionary rule to a theory premised on de-
terrence and cost-benefit analysis.
The result, according to some scholars, is that the exclusionary rule
is now so fraught with exceptions that it is dishonest of the Supreme
Court to continue its case-by-case exclusionary rule charade.32 Further-
more, cases over the last two decades have pierced the prophylactic effect
of the exclusionary rule by transforming the Fourth Amendment's prob-
able cause requirement into an amorphous fact-driven "common-sense"
standard. 33 That standard, for all practical purposes, has whittled away
the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against illegal search and seizure
with an essentially duplicative two-pronged test: 34 the "reasonableness
test ' 35  and the "balancing test."3a6 The reasonableness test considers
whether a reasonable officer would have known that her actions violated
the Fourth Amendment, and whether the individual whose right to privacy
was violated had a reasonable expectation of privacy.37 Scholars maintain
that underlying the reasonableness test is a cost-benefit analysis that
balances the government's interest in prosecuting and convicting the guilty
by protecting seized evidence against an individual's Fourth Amendment
30. See generally John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1027,
1044 (1974) (asserting that the good faith exception puts a premium on keeping police ignorant of
Fourth Amendment law).
31. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (the exclusionary rule is a judicially
created remedy generally to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights through its deterrent effect, rather
than to protect the individual rights of an aggrieved party).
32. See Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the Fourth
Amendment 44 VAND. L. REv. 473, 521-29 (1991). See generally Craig D. Uchida et al., Acting
in Good Faith: The Effects of United States v. Leon on the Police and Courts, 30 ARIZ. L. REV.
467, 485 (1988). Indeed, the good faith standard has proven so hard to challenge that after Leon,
the number of motions to suppress filed in warrant cases diminished significantly, and of those
filed even fewer are granted. Id. at 492-93.
33. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-41 (1983) (holding that probable cause to issue
a search warrant is determined by evaluating the totality of the circumstances).
34. See, e.g., Robert Ward, Consenting to a Search and Seizure in Poor and Minority Neigh-
borhoods: No Place for a "Reasonable Person, " 36 HowARD L. J. 239 (1993). Professor Ward
argues that the utilization of the reasonable person test to determine whether a person's consent
to a search is voluntary ignores the history of racial and ethnic tensions between the police and
members of a particular community. Id. at 253.
35. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987)
(using a "reasonableness test" to determine that the searches were constitutional).
36. For an in-depth critique of the Court's "balancing test," see Silas Wasserstrom & William
J. Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on The Scaffold: But Was It A Fair Trial?, 22 AM. Clum. L.
REV. 84, 87 (1984) ("While this cost-benefit analysis appears neutral and detached, the Court balances
with its thumb on the scale.").
37. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709. Justice O'Connor stated: "Because petitioners
have an 'individualized suspicion' of misconduct by Dr. Ortega, we need not decide whether
individualized suspicion is an essential element of the standard of reasonableness that we adopt
today." Id. at 726; see also United States v. Martinez-Fuente, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976).
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right fo privacy.3 8 Thus, the Court, while relaxing the strictures of previous
Fourth Amendment holdings, avoided explicitly overturning any Fourth
Amendment decisions of the Warren Court.3 9 In effect, the Court has
created a new exception to the exclusionary rule for every case in which
the government's interest in prosecution can be valued over the individual's
right to privacy. 40
B. The Leon Decision
The United States Supreme Court culminated its weakening of the
exclusionary rule in United States v. Leon.41 In Leon, the police launched
a narcotics investigation after receiving information from an informant
concerning suspicious activities. 42 Based on the informant's observations,
the police secured warrants from a state court judge to search residences
and automobiles belonging to the suspects. 43 These searches uncovered
drug contraband and paraphernalia and the suspects were charged in
federal court on various drug offenses."
The district court found that the affidavit in support of the warrant
did not establish probable cause and ordered the evidence suppressed. 45
The Ninth Circuit affirmed,4 ruling that the affidavit did not meet the
Aguilar-Spinelli4 7 test requiring that an affidavit establish the informant's
credibility or basis of knowledge.4
In a six to three decision, the Supreme Court reversed. The Court
held that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should be modified
so as not to exclude evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable
reliance on a search warrant later found to be insupportable by probable
cause and thus illegal. 49 As long as the officer was acting in "good
faith," these illegal warrants were excusable and the fruits of the "good
faith" unlawful search were admissible.50
38. For a thorough discussion of the erosion of the warrant requirement and a criticism of the
reasonableness approach as applied to government drug testing of employees, see Note, Government
Drug Testing: A Question of Reasonableness, 43 VAND. U. REv. 1343 (1990). See, e.g., Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1988); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (eliminating the individualized suspicion requirement when the government
has a special need to perform drug testing).
39. See generally Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Court's Turn Toward a General Reasonableness
Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, 27 AM. Cua. L. REv. 119 (1989).
40. See supra notes 37-38.
41. 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984).
42. Id. at 901-02.
43. Id. at 902.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 903 n.2.
46. Id. at 904.
47. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
48. In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), the Court abandoned the Aguilar-Spinelli test and
replaced it with a "totality of the circumstances approach" to probable cause. In State v. Cordova,
109 N.M. 211, 784 P.2d 30 (1989), the Supreme Court of New Mexico declined to adopt the new
federal constitutional interpretation.
49. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984).
50. Id. at 919.
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Thus, an illegal police search and seizure was not barred by the Fourth
Amendment5' as long as the officer reasonably believed the warrant was
lawful.52 Furthermore, the Court held that the trial court made a "harm-
less" error by condoning these actions. 3
In dissent, Justice Brennan declared that the "Court's gradual but
determined strangulation" of the exclusionary rule had completed "the
Court's victory over the Fourth Amendment. 5 4 In fact, suppression of
unlawfully seized evidence is confined to four exceptions to the "good
faith" exception: (1) if a magistrate is not neutral and detached; (2) if
an affidavit in support of the warrant is knowingly and recklessly false;
(3) if the affidavit clearly lacked probable cause, or (4) if the affidavit
is facially deficient; that is, if it fails to particularize "the place to be
searched or the things to be seized," then the warrant is deemed defective."
Regardless of whether the warrant is defective, the fruits of "good
faith" searches and seizures are admissible, as long as the prosecution
can establish "good faith" without burdening the court with a "substantial
expenditure of judicial time.' '56 In any event, the Leon test shifted the
focus of constitutional analysis from the rights of the individual to the
state of mind of the police officer at the time the warrant was issued."
What inspired the Court to deconstruct federal Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence? To fight the "war on drugs." ' In numerous drug cases
since Leon, the Court has loosened the rules surrounding search warrants.5 9
Given the working relationship between the "war on drugs" and the
"good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule, scholars believe that
one rationale underlying the "good faith" exception is that only guilty
people involved in drug trafficking are denied their constitutional right
51. The plain language of the Fourth Amendment states in pertinent part: "The right of the
People to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated .... U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
52. "A warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to establish that a law enforcement
officer has 'acted in good faith in conducting the search."' Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 (quoting United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 n.32 (1982)).
53. "[Tlhe exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the
errors of judges and magistrates." Leon, 468 U.S. at 916.
54. Leon, 468 U.S. at 928 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949) (holding that the protection of the Fourth Amendment is of no value if letters and private
documents can be illegally seized and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense).
55. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.
56. Id. at 924.
57. Id. at 922 n.20.
58. See Diane-Michele Krasnow, To Stop the Scourge: The Supreme Court's Approach to the
War on Drugs, 19 AM. r. Cium. L. 219, 257; see also Dan Baum, The War on Drugs, 12 Years
Later, A.B.A. J., March 1993, at 74 n.3 (pointing out that federal, state and local governments
spent about 100 billion dollars during the Bush administration. Two-thirds of the federal drug
budget went to pay for more police, drug agents, prosecutors and prisons).
59. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967)
(allowing the issuance of search warrants based on anonymous information); Oliver v. United States,
466 U.S. 170 (1984) (allowing the warrantless search of fields, barns, and other private property
near a residence); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984); Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S.
79 (1987) (allowing the use of evidence obtained under a defective search warrant because officers
acted with "good faith"); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (lowering the permissible ceiling
for aerial warrantless searches to 400 feet).
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to privacy.60 This rationale is a small consolation to those who are caught
up in an illegal search and seizure.
C. The Leon Legacy in the Highest State Courts
In Gutierrez, the New Mexico Supreme Court joins the highest courts
of nine states to reject the "good faith" exception as a matter of judicial
policy: Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New York, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. 6' Generally, these state
courts have based their exclusionary rule on state law, unwilling to adopt
the federal rationale for the exclusionary rule. 62
The New Mexico Supreme Court in Gutierrez also based its rejection
of the "good faith" exception on state law. However, this decision
represents the first case in which a New Mexico court has clearly explained
the reach of the state constitution in relation to the federal exclusionary
rule.
Prior to Mapp, New Mexico courts refused to adopt the exclusionary
rule expounded by Weeks .v. United States.63 Likewise, New Mexico cases
following Mapp failed to explore the reach of article II of the state
constitution apart from the federal exclusionary rule.64
For instance, in State v. Dillon, the court rejected Weeks and reasoned
that the exclusionary rule benefitted only the guilty. 65 In Dillon, the
defendant was prosecuted for possession of "intoxicating liquor for sale. '"6
The court overruled the motion to suppress the "intoxicating liquor" 67
even though the sheriff had seized the liquor under a search warrant
60. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (eliminating Fourth Amendment violations
from constitutional errors worthy of habeas review and reserving Fourth Amendment protection for
the innocent, not the guilty).
61. See, e.g., People v. Bigelow, 488 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1985); State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d
820 (N.J. 1987); State v. Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553 (N.C. 1988); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586
A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991). See generally Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions:
The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1141 (1985); William J. Brennan,
Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HAxv. L. REv. 489 (1977); Ken
Gormley, State Constitutions and Criminal Procedure: A Primer for the 21st Century, 67 OR. L.
REV. 689 (1988).
62. See, e.g., Novembrino, 519 A.2d at 857 ("[Olur State Constitution h[as] not diluted the
effectiveness of our criminal justice system to the uncertain effects that we believe will inevitably
accompany the good faith exception to the federal exclusionary rule.").
63. Gutierrez 1H, 116 N.M. 431, 438, 863 P.2d 1052, 1059 (citing State v. Dillon, 34 N.M. 366,
377, 281 P. 474, 479 (1929)).
64. Gutierrez 11, 116 N.M. at 439, 863 P.2d at 1060 (citing State v. Garcia, 76 N.M. 171, 174-
75, 413 P.2d 210, 212-13 (1966) (holding it is not a search to observe that which occurs in a public
place)); see also State v. Lucero, 70 N.M. 268, 275, 372 P.2d 837, 842 (1962) (denying suppression
under federal rule that a warrant is not required for the search of a movable vehicle if officers
have reasonable cause to believe that it contains contraband).
65. The court reasoned:
The innocent could derive no benefit from an interpretation of the constitutional
guaranty into the rule of evidence contended for, and surely the guilty are not
entitled to, and were never intended to be given a benefit and protection which
are not shared equally by the innocent.
Dillon, 34 N.M. at 375, 281 P. at 478.
66. Dillon, 34 N.M. at 336, 281 P. at 474.
67. Id.
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that the trial court found and the Attorney General conceded was illegal."
The court in Dillon applied a balancing test. The court reasoned:
If the constitutional rights of the people were really involved, practical
considerations would be excluded. Considering that they are not in-
volved, and considering it as a choice between evils, we choose what
we deem the lesser. 69
In Gutierrez, the court overruled Dillon, rejecting its balancing test and
its reasoning that the exclusionary rule benefits only the guilty.70
The Gutierrez court considered a number of New Mexico cases finding
searches constitutionally reasonable under federal standards. 7' However,
those cases did not discuss these federal standards in relation to the
federal "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule. 72 In Gutierrez,
the court searched for New Mexico case law that independently explored
the reach of article II, section 10.73 For the most part, it came up dry.
For example, the court in State v. Snedeker had applied the United States
Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment cost-benefit analysis; however, it
did not review article II of the state constitution. 74
Apparently, the only New Mexico case that the court could turn to
for an interpretation of article II, section 10 was State v. Cordova.75
Article II, section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution provides that "no
warrant . . . shall issue . . . without a written showing of probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation .. . . 76 In Cordova, the New Mexico
Supreme Court held that the two-prong test set forth in Aguilar-Spinelli
properly describes the New Mexico Constitution's protection against un-
reasonable searches and seizures. 77 Hence, the New Mexico Supreme Court
rejected the "totality of the circumstances" analysis of probable cause
announced by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates.71
Possibly the court chose to follow Cordova because it represents the
moment at which the court recognized its first departure from federal
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 79 At the very least, we know that
Cordova opened the door for state Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in
68. Id.
69. Dillon, 34 N.M. at 378, 281 P. at 486.
70. Gutierrez II, 116 N.M. at 436 n.9, 863 P.2d at 1067 n.9.
71. Id. at 440, 863 P.2d at 1061.
72. Id. (citing State v. Herrera, 102 N.M. 254, 258-59, 694 P.2d 510, 514-15 (holding that a
search was illegal under both federal and state constitutions, but without discussing the state
constitution), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1103 (1985)).
73. Gutierrez II, 116 N.M. at 440, 863 P.2d at 1061.
74. 99 N.M. 286, 288-89, 657 P.2d 613, 615-16 (1982) (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
485-86 (1976) ("The primary justification for the exclusionary rule then is the deterrence of police
conduct that violates Fourth Amendment rights.")).
75. Gutierrez II, 116 N.M. at 440, 863 P.2d at 1061 (citing State v. Cordova, 109 N.M. 211,
784 P.2d 30 (1989)).
76. N.M. CoNsT. art. II, § 10.
77. Gutierrez II, 116 N.M. at 440, 863 P.2d at 1062 (citing Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108
(1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969)).
78. Gutierrez II, 116 N.M. at 440, 863 P.2d at 1062 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213
(1983)).
79. Gutierrez 1, 112 N.M. 774, 778, 819 P.2d 1332, 1336 (Ct. App. 1991).
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New Mexico. The court's decision in Gutierrez marks the continuation
of "a willingness to undertake independent analysis of our state consti-
tutional guarantees when federal law begins to encroach on the sanctity
of those guarantees.
' 80
IV. RATIONALE OF THE GUTIERREZ COURT
In Gutierrez, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that evidence ob-
tained by virtue of an invalid search warrant may not be admitted under
the exclusionary rule's "good faith" exception."' Rather, the court found
that article II, section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizures and mandates the issuance of search
warrants only upon a showing of probable cause.
2
In order to derive the meaning and scope of state constitutional guar-
antees under article II, the court first turned to the difficult task of
determining the framers' intent. After considering the historical context
in which New Mexico gained statehood, Chief Justice Ransom concluded
that the framers may have simply adopted article II, giving little or no
thought to its "scope, meaning or effect." 3
Thus, the court turned to case law relevant to article II, from which
the New Mexico search and seizure law may have emerged.4 The Gutierrez
court discovered that at the time the text of the New Mexico Constitution
was under consideration, one federal district court and two state supreme
courts had held inadmissible evidence obtained in violation of the con-
stitutional right to be free from illegal searches and seizures.8 5 Again,
the court found it difficult to draw any definitive conclusions about the
framers' intent from the context of the issue's common-law history.
6
The court concluded that the most reasonable inference to be drawn
from the history of the adoption of article II was "that the framers
were aware of the controversy and left interpretation to the courts rather
than address the exclusion directly in the text of the constitution.' '87 This
conclusion freed the Court to interpret article II by drawing on exclu-
sionary rule rationale, reasoning and policy created by courts from around
the country.
80. GutierrezI, 116 N.M. at 440, 863 P.2d at 1061.
81. Id. at 447, 863 P.2d at 1068.
82. Id. at 444-47, 863 P.2d at 1065-68.
83. Id. at 441, 863 P.2d at 1062 (citing ROBERT W. LARSON, NEW MEXICO'S QUEST FOR STATEHOOD
1846-1912 272-304 (1968); Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the Proposed State of
New Mexico (1910)).
84. Id. at 438-40, 863 P.2d at 1059-61.
85. Id. at 442, 863 P.2d at 1063 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) ("[F]orcible
and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence
to convict him of crime or to forfeit his goods, is within the condemnation of that judgment.");
United States v. Wong Quong Wong, 94 F. 832 (D. Vt. 1899) (excluding letters obtained by unlawful
search and seizure); State v. Sheridan, 96 N.W. 730 (Iowa 1903) (holding that evidence obtained
in violation of the Iowa's search and seizure provision is to be excluded for trial)).
86. GutierrezII, 116 N.M. at 443, 863 P.2d at 1064.
87. Id. at 444, 863 P.2d at 1065.
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To begin its state constitutional analysis, the court relied upon United
States v. Mounday,8 s an opinion that was later to reappear in Weeks v.
United States. 9 The Gutierrez court's return to the exclusionary rule's
Fourth Amendment roots, found in and prior to Weeks, clearly shows
its decision to articulate a rule of exclusion based on state constitutional
guarantees, rather than on federal theories of deterrence, cost-benefit
analysis or judicial integrity. 90
Thus, the court focused on those constitutional guarantees:
We ask, much as the court in Mounday asked, how this Court can
effectuate the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable search
and seizure. The answer to us is clear: to deny the government the
use of evidence obtained pursuant to an unlawful search. This, we
believe, is the rationale at work in Weeks.9I
The court argued that the criticism that the exclusionary rule benefits
only the guilty misses the point.9 2 Rather, the exclusionary rule is "the
necessary corollary of the constitutional mandate." 93 This standard em-
braces the notion that "admission of improperly seized evidence denigrates
the integrity of the judiciary-judges become accomplices to unconsti-
tutional executive conduct."'4
Beyond the issue of judicial integrity, the supreme court adopted a
vision of the exclusionary rule that enforces the constitutional guarantee
that each individual be free from unreasonable search and seizure. 9
Denying the government the fruits of unconstitutional conduct at trial
best effectuates the constitutional proscription of unreasonable searches
88. 208 F. 186 (D. Kan. 1913). The defendants in Mounday filed a request for the return of
property seized pursuant to an illegal search. The court granted application and ordered the property
returned. The Gutierrez Court quoted from the Mounday opinion:
In order to secure such proof and assist the government in overcoming the pre-
sumption of innocence which attends upon defendants and all other citizens until
lawful conviction had, shall this court wink at the unlawful manner in which the
government secured the proofs now desired to be used, and condone the wrong
done defendants by the ruthless invasion of their constitutional rights, and become
a party to the wrongful act by permitting the use of the fruits of such act? Such
is not my conception of the sanctity of rights expressly guaranteed by the Constitution
to a citizen.
Gutierrez II, 116 N.M. at 444-45, 863 P.2d at 1065-66 (quoting Mounday, 208 F. at 189.).
89. 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (explaining the rationale for excluding evidence obtained in violation
of the Fourth Amendment enforcment of the Constitution).
90. Gutierrez II, 116 N.M. at 442, 863 P.2d at 1063 (relying on State v. Slamon, 50 A. 1097(Vt. 1901) and State v. Sheridan, 96 N.W. 730 (Iowa 1903)).
91. Gutierrez I, 116 N.M. at 445, 863 P.2d at 1066.
92. Id. at 446, 863 P.2d at 1067 n.9 (citing State v. Davis, 666 P.2d 802 (Or. 1983) (en banc)(under the Oregon Constitution the exclusionary rule is "to preserve that person's rights to the
same extent as if the government's officers had stayed within the law")).
93. Id. (stating that the exclusionary rule is a necessary corollary to the constitutional mandate
to exclude evidence seized in violation of art. II, § 10 in a criminal action founded on illegal
government conduct; this is to be distinguished from the issue of illegal searches that do not lead
to criminal prosecution).
94. Id. at 446-47, 863 P.2d at 1067-68 ("The basis we articulate today for the exclusionary rule
. is incompatible with any exception based on the good-faith reliance of the officer on the
magistrate's determination either of probable cause or of the reasonableness of the search.").
95. Id.
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and seizures by preserving the rights of the accused to the same extent
as if the government's officers has stayed within the law. 6
The Supreme Court of New Mexico should be applauded for interpreting
the New Mexico Constitution so that the judiciary, through the exclu-
sionary rule, can give meaning to the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. In State v. Gutierrez, the court has refused to
sanction police misconduct by "turning the other cheek."
97
V. CONCLUSION
United States v. Leon created an exception to the exclusionary rule
which provided that whenever an officer executed a search pursuant to
a warrant that later proved invalid, her "good faith" belief in the warrant
would preserve otherwise excludable evidence. The New Mexico Supreme
Court has rejected the "good faith" exception.
The New Mexico Supreme Court understands that the "good faith"
exception is a procedural "Catch 22." In effect, the United States Supreme
Court promises, in advance, that only the rights of the guilty will be
violated because only the guilty would suffer an illegal search and seizure
of evidence. The Court assumes that the innocent will not be subject to
an illegal search or seizure, because of the "good faith" of a police
officer.
This reasoning overlooks a basic tenet of due process underlying the
criminal justice system: people are innocent until proven guilty. Under
the "good faith" exception, people can be proven guilty with illegally
seized evidence because they are assumed guilty once evidence has been
seized. The state can prove they are guilty because they are assumed
guilty if their rights have been violated, as long as the governmental
interest in the arrest outweighs that particular individual's constitutional
rights .98
In Gutierrez, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the "good
faith" exception to the federal exclusionary rule is incompatible with the
constitutional protection found under article II; thus, the fruits of the
search conducted in the Gutierrez' home were suppressed because the
actions of the police violated the New Mexico Constitution.9 Although
Gutierrez does not address the ultimate validity of judicial predetermi-
nation of "no-knock" warrants,' °° it sends a clear message to lower
courts that police need more than a "good faith" belief in exigent
96. Id. at 446, 863 P.2d at 1067.
97. Id.
98. To illustrate this point consider the Court's decision to permit pretrial preventive detention
in U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). The Court considered the constitutionality of the Bail
Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(0, and explicitly ruled that in times of war or insurrection "the
government's regulatory interest in community safety can outweigh an individual's liberty interest."
481 U.S. at 748.
99. Gutierrez II, 116 N.M. at 447, 863 P.2d at 1068.
100. Id. at 435, 863 P.2d at 1056.
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circumstances. In order to obtain a valid search warrant, the police must
particularize facts of exigent circumstances in an affidavit; otherwise,
material seized during the search will be excluded from evidence as the
fruit of unconstitutional conduct. Hereafter in New Mexico, the police
will be allowed to burst into the homes of individuals unannounced only
if exigent circumstance, in fact, exist.
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